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Kreitzer, A.C., and Regehr, W.G. (2002). Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 12, ketchup-drizzled ice cream delicately perched on top
324–330. of a succulently juicy hot dog may seem a quite sensible
Malenka, R.C., and Nicoll, R.A. (1999). Science 285, 1870–1874. breakfast during childhood.
Markram, H., and Tsodyks, M. (1996). Nature 382, 807–810. Recent work has significantly advanced understand-
ing of neural building blocks underlying hedonics ofSjo¨stro¨m, P.J., Turrigiano, G.G., and Nelson, S.B. (2001). Neuron 32,
1149–1164. chemosensory experience (Zald et al., 1998; Gottfried
Sjo¨stro¨m, P.J., Turrigiano, G.G., and Nelson, S.B. (2003). Neuron 39, et al., 2002; Anderson et al., 2003; Small et al., 2003 [this
this issue, 641–654. issue of Neuron]). In this issue of Neuron, Small and
colleagues used fMRI to examine the neural basis of
why things taste good or bad and how the neural coding
of these hedonic dimensions is related to the intensity
of taste. Low and high concentrations of sucrose andDissociating Intensity from Valence quinine sulfate were administered such that the subjec-
as Sensory Inputs to Emotion tive intensity and hedonic quality could be examined
independently. These two dimensions are normally
strongly positively correlated in everyday life. For exam-
ple, the bitterness of vinegar may be pleasing at low
concentrations, but strongly aversive at high concentra-In this issue of Neuron, Small and colleagues used
tions. Through careful manipulation, Small et al. foundfMRI to find evidence for a neural segregation of two
that the often-correlated dimensions of valence and in-dimensions underlying human gustatory experience:
tensity are supported by dissociable neural substrates.intensity and valence. These results join several recent
In particular, responses in the pons, mid-insular cortex,reports that challenge long-held notions regarding
and the amygdala responded commensurately with theamygdaloid representation of negatively valenced
intensity of taste irrespective of its hedonic quality. Inevents.
contrast, the anteroventral insular cortex and secondary
taste areas in orbitofrontal cortex, inter alia, were re-A salad of perfectly grilled woodsy-flavored calamari
sponsive to hedonic value irrespective of intensity. Fur-paired with subtly bitter pale green leaves of curly endive
thermore, the right caudolateral orbitofrontal cortex wasand succulent petals of tomato flesh in a deep, rich
more responsive to the pleasant experience of sucrose,balsamic dressing. Delicate slices of pan-roasted duck
and the anterior left orbitofrontal cortex and dorsal insu-breast saturated with an assertive, tart-sweet tamarind-
lar cortex were more responsive to the unpleasant expe-infused marinade. A big, vibrant Pinot Noir with ripe,
rience of quinine.sun-dried cherry fruit and smoky, wood-spiced notes.
The results of Small’s study of taste bear remarkableHungry? The above descriptions serve to illustrate how
similarity to our recent results in olfaction (Anderson etthe subjective complexity and infinite variety of gusta-
al., 2003). In a similar design, we found that the amygdalatory experience may rest upon only a few primary dimen-
and adjacent primary olfactory cortex were driven by
sions such as quality (e.g., sweet, bitter, sour), intensity
the intensity of odorants independent of their judged
(subtle or robust), and hedonic tone or valence (pleasant
valence, and conversely, distinct right and left orbito-
or unpleasant). Such a coarse coding scheme may be
frontal regions responded to pleasant and unpleasant
likened to the retinal decomposition into short, medium, valence, independent of judged intensity. The striking
and long wavelengths underlying the experience of convergence of these two studies provides firm ground
color, but in fact, it deviates in a critical regard. Unlike for two notions regarding the neural representation of
vision, reward value appears to be a fundamental dimen- affective responses.
sion of gustatory sensation, without need for higher- First, electrophysiological, lesion, and imaging stud-
order stimulus associations. This characteristic may in- ies have in the past pointed to an essential role of the
fuse chemosensory experience with an acute emotional amygdala in the processing of threatening, fearful, and
primacy (Schiffman, 1974). highly aversive events (Aggleton, 2000). This view has
In humans’ present ecological niche, many eat for been challenged by findings demonstrating amygdala
pleasure. The origins of taste preference, however, are involvement in processing positively valenced events
utilitarian, not esthetic. For example, sweetness is com- (Cahill and McGaugh, 1990). Such indeterminacy of what
mon to safely edible foods, whereas bitterness may sig- characterizes amygdala responsiveness is likely related
nify poison or spoilage. Therefore, humans do not enter to the multidimensional nature of affective space. Inten-
the world with a tabula rasa palate, as evidenced by sity and valence are often asymmetrically correlated
aversive responses to bitter taste in neonates (Steiner between valences. Viewing negative stimuli (e.g., a pic-
et al., 2001). That said, food preference is also dynamic ture of a vicious dog) typically results in a more intense
and follows a developmental course that is modulated and arousing subjective and physiological response
by the powerful influence of culture (Rozin and Fallon, than viewing positive stimuli (e.g., a puppy). The Small
1987). For example, although highly aversive to adults, study demonstrated that when this inequity in experien-
for young children excrement is not excluded from the tial intensity is eliminated, the amygdala responds ro-
list of appropriate things to place in one’s mouth (despite bustly and equally both to events evoking positive and
other neonatal taste aversions). Less appallingly, the to events evoking negative hedonic experience. Such a
appropriateness of foods for different times of day and pattern of response could reflect that the amygdala
restrictions for their complimentariness have a develop- codes the intensity of experience irrespective of va-
lence, or rather, that it codes variations in both pleasantmental time course as well. For instance, the idea of
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and unpleasant valence. Results from Small et al. (2003) is foul by American standards, but may be appetizing
to a hungry Icelander, to whom fermented shark is aand Anderson et al. (2003) were consistent with the for-
mer: when valence was held constant, the amygdala traditional culinary delicacy (ha´karl). Even to an Ice-
lander such appeal would diminish after having satedwas vigorously responsive to manipulations of intensity,
and when intensity was held constant, the amygdala one’s appetite. Such flexibility of hedonic response is
the hallmark of OFC representations, which are modu-was quiescent to manipulations of valence.
Second, despite strong phenomenal correlation, the lated by changes in behavioral relevance, such as the
hunger state of the perceiver (O’Doherty et al., 2000).above results suggest that there is a fundamental segre-
gation in the neural representations of the intensity and This individual and situational variability in hedonic re-
sponsiveness is integral to any account of the neuralvalence of sensory experience. This finding is consistent
with psychological theories of the underlying structure representation of affectivity and reflects the malleability
of human hedonic experience that is characteristic ofof emotion, which propose that unified affective experi-
ence is the result of activation along separate dimen- the flexible and integrative functions often ascribed to
the prefrontal cortices.sions of experiential intensity (also referred to as
arousal) and valence. Small et al.’s findings also illuminate the proposed
hedonic primacy of chemical sensation. The first stagesAll that said, a word of caution is merited in that much
of the evidence in support of this newly emerging view of taste processing, from pontine taste relay nuclei to
mid-insular primary taste cortex, were shown to be in-of amygdaloid encoding is the result of human imaging
studies. All methods of measuring neural activity have sensitive to the hedonic quality of taste input. Rather,
these regions were modulated by the quantity and notparticular strengths and weaknesses that predispose
them to better measure particular patterns of neural the quality of stimulation. By contrast, adjacent second-
ary taste cortex in the OFC was modulated by the pleas-activity, while they fail to discern others. For example,
functional imaging (PET and fMRI) is a strong method ant and unpleasant quality and not the amount of stimu-
lation. This evidence suggests a hierarchical neuralfor measuring activity in relatively large regions of brain
simultaneously. This enables questions on whole-brain coding scheme, whereby early intensity coding is further
elaborated into differentiable responses to pleasant andintact processing that are far beyond the scope of re-
cording electrodes. By contrast, the temporal (seconds) unpleasant taste. Compared to other sensory systems
such as vision, the hedonic differentiation undertakenand spatial (millimeters) resolution of functional imaging
is poor in relation to many of the underlying processes by the OFC occurs relatively early in the neural hierarchy.
Although the OFC has been shown to critically partici-of interest. For example, the amygdala may still be en-
coding sensory valence, but using a temporal rather pate in the anticipation and receipt of reward across a
variety of sensory systems, in the case of gustatory andthan rate-encoding scheme. In other words, stimulus
valence may be reflected in the temporal order of amyg- olfactory sensation, the OFC does double duty, also
being the region where basic analysis of stimulus inputdaloid activity rather than in its overall activity rate. Such
encoding is undetectable using current functional im- occurs. This sharing of common neural resources may
subject chemical senses to a degree of inseparabilityaging methods. Furthermore, the spatial resolution of
functional imaging may also prevent measuring amyg- from hedonic response. Although not discriminated at
the earliest stages of processing, hedonic quality maydaloid valence coding with fMRI. Specifically, if a very
small proportion of amygdaloid neurons encode for va- nevertheless be dominant in organizing the character
of chemosensory perception, effectively coloring thelence while the majority encode for intensity, this limited
spatial representation may be obscured. Thus, for the brain’s chemical interface with the world (Schiffman,
1974).newly emerging view of amygdaloid processing to take
firm root, the studies of both Small et al. (2003) and The neural evidence from gustatory and olfactory re-
sponses may have a lot to say about higher-order formsAnderson et al. (2003) await replication with additional
methods of measuring neural activity. of emotional responsiveness. In humans, it has been
argued that gustatory sensation is the origin of the basicIf hedonic quality is not encoded in the amygdala,
where in the brain is this dimension encoded? Many emotion of disgust (literally meaning “bad taste”), and
more abstractly, moral offensiveness (Rozin and Fallon,studies point to the orbitofrontal cortices (OFC) (Zald et
al., 1998). The results of Small et al. suggest that a 1987). Such neural processing of taste not only serves
as the basis for food rejection but may provide the neuralconstellation of discrete OFC and anterior insular corti-
cal regions code for gustatory preferences. Consistent substrates for such lofty emotional responses as repul-
sion toward acts against humanity. Evidence consistentwith this proposed extra-amygdala locus of hedonic
tone, the underlying structure of positive and negative with this neural elevation of more primitive distaste pro-
cessing is shown in how identification of social signalsaffectivity has been shown to remain intact following
amygdala lesions (Anderson and Phelps, 2002) but to of disgust depend upon the same anteroventral insular
cortical region involved in hedonic valuation of tastebe damaged following stroke affecting prefrontal corti-
ces and in particular the OFC (Davidson and Irwin, 1999). (Phillips et al., 1997). The degree to which such primitive
hedonic processing is integrated with cognition will beSuch critical prefrontal contributions to hedonicity dove-
tail nicely with appraisal theories of human emotion that an important subject for future study.
Unraveling the neural substrates underlying humanemphasize how affective responses are not simply a
reflection of the intrinsic quality (positive versus nega- emotional competence will surely further reveal its de-
pendence on an intricate balance of neural activity intive) of a stimulus, but result from interactions among
the person, the situational context, and the stimulus. regions representing different sensory dimensions. Elu-
cidating these mechanisms may finally allow an appreci-For example, the smell and taste of rotting shark meat
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ation of various oddities of human nature, such as why
a charcoal-grilled filet mignon just tastes so good with
a full-bodied Australian Cabernet Sauvignon. Hungry yet?
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